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Abstract: We analyze the determinants of environmental policy
when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction
on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of
allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying
increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but
has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competi-
tor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting
emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobby-
ing is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality,
as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively
unproductive private lobbying.
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1 Introduction
Often, different lobbies share a common goal, but disagree about specifics.
For example, representatives of polluting industries agree that overall emis-
sion standards should be lax, but have different preferences about how to
distribute the burden of any legally required emissions reduction between
them. There are many variants of this theme. For instance, environmental
taxes may be uniform across sectors, or they may allow loopholes for specific
industries or regions. Among different tax proposals that lead to the same
total level of emissions, each industry (region) will prefer the one that leaves a
particularly comfortable loophole to itself.1 Similarly, compared with market
entrants, mature firms with large production capacities and little ambition
to extend these capacities will prefer a regulation that concentrates on new
sources to a uniform treatment of plants. Finally, compared to moderate
polluters, firms who have had high emissions in the past will have stronger
preferences for grandfathering approaches as opposed to auctions of tradeable
permits.
In these settings, an opponent of regulation has to decide whether he
should fight regulation as such or whether he should take regulation as in-
evitable and concentrate on influencing the details in his favor. We analyze
this decision in a model with two anti-regulation lobbies, each of which has
two instruments to influence the degree to which it is affected by regulation.
On the one hand, a group can lobby against regulation as such, thereby
providing a benefit to the other anti-environmental lobby as well. On the
other hand, it can concentrate on ”lobbying for loopholes”, so as to affect
the precise nature of regulation in its favor, without providing benefits to
the other lobby. For instance, particular sectors can lobby for exemptions
from environmental taxes, without fighting the tax itself. Firms in depressed
1For instance, apart from a preferential treatment of the manufacturing industry as
opposed to the service industry, the German Eco Tax (”O¨kosteuer”) contains a complicated
set of special regulations which amount to loopholes for specific sectors (Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung 1999, Chapt. 1, Tab. 1, Bundesumweltministerium 2002).
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regions can lobby for special treatment. Mature firms may lobby to restrict
emission standards to new plants, etc.
In our model, the politician is represented by a policy formation function,
which translates individual levels of private and general lobbying into pollu-
tion standards. We show how lobbying efforts and the resulting individual
pollution levels in the Nash equilibrium depend on a parameter that captures
the effectiveness of private lobbying. For given levels of each type of lobby-
ing, higher values of this parameter mean that allowed emissions for each
firm increase. Our central point is that, because of strategic interactions,
greater effectiveness of private lobbying may nevertheless be detrimental to
firms and beneficial for the environment. If lobbyists expect that politicians
pay a lot of attention to such private lobbying for loopholes, they will tend
to focus on this kind of lobbying, rather than on general lobbying against en-
vironmental regulation itself. For the lobbyists, general lobbying is a public
good. The tendency for underprovision of this public good is enhanced by the
existence of the alternative of private lobbying. Thus, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, a greater willingness of politicians to pay attention to private lobbying
may well be detrimental to lobbyists - and beneficial to the environment.
Our approach has some bearing on a central question of positive environ-
mental economics, namely, what kind of regulation is likely to emerge as the
outcome of the political process? This question has at least two dimensions.
First, what kind of instruments are likely to be used to improve environ-
mental quality?2 Second, why are some environmental problems regulated
more vigorously than others?3 For this kind of application one idea is crucial:
The effectiveness of private lobbying is not only a function of the politician’s
2A large literature investigates this question. For surveys, in particular, on the issue
of whether command-and-control or market instruments are more likely to be chosen, see
Keohane et al. (2000) and Dijkstra (1999).
3For instance, why have emissions such as lead, carbon monoxide, NOx and many water
pollutants been combatted successfully in many industrial countries whereas in other policy
areas (CO2, benzene, noise, species extinction) very little has changed despite considerable
public attention?
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behavior, but also of the particular regulation problem under consideration.
Some issues are more likely to generate loophole lobbying than others.
For instance, an economy-wide energy tax, like the German Eco Tax,
can be designed in many different ways, with exemptions for various sectors.
Thus, there is much scope for loophole lobbying of specific sectors. Such a
tax may thus be implemented because industries engage heavily in private
lobbying rather than coordinating effectively to fight regulation as such.
At the other extreme, take highway speed regulation. For automobile
firms as the anti-regulation lobbyists, there is little scope for disagreement
concerning highway speed regulation. A speed limit may be more or less
rigid, but that is about as far as regulatory flexibility goes: An individual
exemption from speed limits for Porsches or BMWs would be inconceivable,
so private lobbying in this area cannot achieve much. Thus, if firms spend
effort on lobbying, it must necessarily be directed towards preventing regu-
lation as such rather than towards obtaining loopholes. Even though general
lobbying is still subject to free riding, this problem is mitigated by the ab-
sence of the alternative, private lobbying. It is therefore not surprising that
lobbying of the German auto industry against speed restrictions has been
highly successful. Obviously, our argument cannot provide a complete expla-
nation of observed regulatory behavior. With respect to speed regulation, we
have little to say about why speed regulation was lax in Germany, but not
in other countries. One might resort to an argument that German car firms
have stronger incentives to fight regulation than others. It is precisely the
strength of our approach that we do not rely on such arguments. We show
that for given benefits from preventing regulation, differences in objective
possibilities for private lobbying might explain why regulation is more severe
in some areas than in others.
An alternative application concerns the principle that emission standards
must be non-discriminatory rather than differentiating across firms. By fa-
miliar textbook arguments, differentiatiation of standards has efficiency ad-
vantages similar to those of taxes or tradeable permits: By differentiating
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standards so as to equate the marginal costs of abatement, the total costs of
achieving a target level of emissions can be minimized in principle.4 Our ideas
suggest that, nevertheless, firms might prefer a legal environment where dif-
ferentated standards are prohibited: Without such differentiation, firms are
aware that the only way to secure high emissions standards for themselves is
to work towards the common goal of a lax uniform standard. If differentia-
tion is allowed, there is scope for private lobbying, which may prevent them
from focussing on fighting regulation as such.
We believe that lobbyists are aware of the conflict between private and
general lobbying. For instance, in a recent press release the German Associ-
ation of the Automotive Industry VDA explicitly demands a common stance
of the VDA and the Logistics Industry Association BGL against a heavy
vehicle charge rather than ”speculation about possible distributive effects of
the charge” (VDA 2001). More generally, industry associations are typically
members of higher level associations. These associations typically deal with
activities that we would describe as general lobbying. For instance, the press
releases of the German BDI usually concern general topics such as climate
policy, water policy or even abstract concepts like the precautionary princi-
ple.5 The associations can therefore be interpreted as institutional answer to
the problem of excessive private lobbying.
Though there is a considerable literature on the explanation of environ-
mental policy,6 we are not aware of any alternative approach that deals with
multi-dimensional lobbying. Beyond environmental policy, the lobbying liter-
ature in the tradition of Bernheim andWhinston and Grossman and Helpman
does not address the tradeoff between general and private lobbying either. A
vaguely related paper is Bennedsen and Feldmann which also analyzes the
choice between different types of lobbying activities. There, however, the
lobbies choose between informational lobbying and contribution payments
rather than general and private lobbying.
4Obviously, informational requirements prohibit a perfect implementation of this idea.
5http://www.bdi-online.de
6See Hahn (1990), Fredriksson (1997), Damania (1999) and the survey of Polk (2002).
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our general frame-
work. Section 3 provides simple versions of the model where private and
general lobbying are discrete choices. Section 4 presents comparative stat-
ics results under the assumption of a fixed budget for lobbying. Section 5
extends the analysis to an endogenous budget. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Framework
2.1 General Assumptions
We analyze two firms whose production involves pollution. In a lobbying
game, firms can influence environmental policy, which, for simplicity, corre-
sponds directly to an allowed emissions level  for each firm. Profits are
given in reduced form as follows.
Assumption 1 The profit of firm  ( ≡ 1 2) is an increasing and concave
function  (), that is bounded above by   0.7
Denote the level of private lobbying for firm  as  ≥ 0, the level of
general lobbying as  ≥ 0. Both  and  are costs for firm . The benefits
of lobbying are higher allowed emissions.We suppose individual pollution
standards are functions (  ) where  = 1 + 2 and 	 6=  as follows.
Assumption 2 Individual pollution standards are increasing and concave in
 and , and non-increasing and convex in  for 	 6= .
General lobbying efforts of both firms are thus perfect substitutes, so that
firms provide a public good through general lobbying.8 In contrast, private
7This formulation implies that the firms are not active in the same industry, in which
case a function 
¡
 
¢
with 
±
  0 would be more adequate, as more restrictive
environmental standards for competitors would usually be beneficial for other firms.
8Obviously, general lobbying is only a public good for the set of firms, not for other
groups of society.
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lobbying of a firm is not a public good. It increases the individual pollution
standard of a firm, but it decreases the level of allowed pollution for the other
firm or at least leaves its level unaffected.9
Finally, we denote the net payoff of firm  as
Π
¡
   
¢
= 
¡

¡
  
¢¢
−  − 
 (1)
We analyze the game in which firms simultaneously maximize net payoffs.
We often parameterize the emissions function as (   ) such that


≥ 0; 
2

 0 for  = 1 2;
2

≤ 0 for  = 1 2 	 6= 
 (2)
Therefore  reflects increasing absolute and marginal productivity of pri-
vate lobbying in increasing emissions, and a potential competitive element
of lobbying (in that private lobbying by one party reduces the effectiveness
of lobbying by the other one).10 We shall carry out comparative statics with
respect to .
2.2 Separable Emissions Functions
Specifically, we often use the separable emissions function
(  ; ) =  () + 
¡
 ; 
¢

 (3)
 is a base level of allowed pollution that depends only on general lobbying.
In accordance with assumption 2,  is increasing and concave in .  is a
loophole to firm , which the politician grants in return for private lobbying.
In accordance with assumption 2,  is increasing and concave in  and non-
increasing and convex in . A loophole increases the individual pollution
standard of a firm above the base level. Its size depends on private lobbying
9In section 2.3, we discuss more precisely which activities should be considered and
general lobbying, respectively.
10There is no general assumption on the relation between  and the marginal produc-
tivity of general lobbying.
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efforts. Both firms compete for loopholes, because the politician has only
a limited ability to grant individual exemptions. He is willing to increase
individual pollution standards above the basic level of allowed pollution if a
firm engages in private lobbying, but he cannot do so arbitrarily, for instance,
because he expects to lose reputation if he is too closely aligned to specific
firms.
For  to capture the effectiveness of private lobbying as in (2), we postu-
late


≥ 0; 
2

 0 for  = 1 2;
2

≤ 0 for  = 1 2 	 6= 
 (4)
 combines several different effects. Most obviously, this parameter might
be inversely related to the moral standards of politicians. The easier it is to
bribe policy makers, the higher  should be. Similarly,  might be inversely
related to the public attention to the problem and the welfare benefits of
environmental improvements: The more the public cares about the environ-
ment, the harder it will be to influence politicians by lobbying for loopholes.
A final interpretation relates to characteristics of the problem itself: As dis-
cussed in the introduction, some kinds of problems simply allow less scope
for loopholes than others. It is this last interpretation that is most fruitful
to explain why different environmental issues are regulated more vigorously
than others.
The specification described by (3) and (4) clearly is an oversimplification.
Politicians have limited capacities to react to lobbying capacities: if they
are overwhelmed by high levels of private lobbying activity, they will not
pay as much attention to general lobbying activities as when emissions are
low. In section 5.3, we therefore also consider an example of a non-separable
emissions function, which satisfies (2), but not (3) and (4).
2.3 Some remarks on Interpretation
In real-world applications, the interpretation of our concepts private and
general lobbying depends very much on the precise setting.
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First, the set of agents considered matters a lot. In one interpretation, the
lobbies could be different firms from one industry. In another interpretation,
each lobby could correspond to a different industry association. In the former
case, activities directed towards reducing emissions of the particular industry
would be classified as general lobbying, in the latter case as private lobbying.
Second, the interpretation depends on the types of environmental regula-
tion against which private lobbying might be directed. Take the German Eco
Tax as an example. To recall, this is an economy-wide energy tax which was
(and still is) opposed by most industries in the country. Thus, if a represen-
tative of one industry fights successfully to reduce the overall tax, the other
industries benefit as well, so that we can speak of general lobbying. What we
consider as private lobbying, however, is ambiguous. In a narrow interpreta-
tion, private lobbying activities would correspond to all activities directed at
achieving reduced tax rates for the specific industry.11 Alternatively, instead
of interpreting private lobbying as an attempt to prevent the sector-specific
effects of economy-wide regulation, we could also consider it as directed to-
wards fighting sector-specific regulation. In Germany, for instance, the food
industry association BVE recently engaged in campaigns against a manda-
tory deposit on beverage cans, against mandatory consumer information on
food quality and for a more liberal treatment of genetic food.12 The auto
industry represented by the VdA fought against a charge on heavy vehicles,
against highway speed regulations and against an obligation to take back old
cars.1314 Our following analysis will be applicable both with the narrower
11As an extreme case, an industry may explicitly demand exemptions from regulation.
As an intermediate case between private and general lobbying, an industry might argue
against the tax as such, but emphasize the detrimental effects on the particular sector.
When German industry associations argue against the Eco Tax, they usually take this
approach: The chemical industry association VCI emphasizes the cost increase for basic
inputs (see http://www.vci.de), the mineral oil industry association MWV highlights the
increased costs of steel production (see http://www.mwv.de), etc.
12See http://www.bve.de.
13See http://www.vda.de.
14The distinction between private lobbying (interpreted as sector-specific lobbying) and
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and the broader interpretation of private information.
A last remark concerns the channels of influence by which private and
general lobbying take place. Both types of lobbying can take various forms:
information campaigns, legal or illegal contribution payments, or the promise
of cooperation in other policy areas. Very roughly, one would expect gen-
eral lobbying to be more secretive: The smaller the group of society whose
interests the lobbying activities represents, the less likely it is that public
information campaigns receive much attention.
3 An Example: Discrete Choice
We illustrate our main ideas in a simplified version of the model. Suppose
that both private and general lobbying levels can only be chosen as 0 or 1.
Thus,  ∈ {0 1}   ∈ {0 1}. We further specify
 = 
¡
1 + 2
¢
+  (5)
where   0,   0. The parameters  and  measure the effectiveness of
general and private lobbying, respectively.15 Finally, we specify

¡

¢
=
√

 (6)
3.1 Fixed Budget
We first consider the additional simplification that each firm  has a fixed
lobbying budget (1 unit), which can either be allocated to general or to
private lobbying. Thus,  = 1− is the amount of general lobbying by firm
. Using (5), firm 0s emissions are  =  (2− 1 − 2) + . Suppressing
general lobbying is gradual: For instance, in its struggle against the mandatory deposit,
the food industry received support from the metal industry as producers of beverage cans
(http://www.stahl-online.de).
15In this specification, emissions are 0 without lobbying. Nothing of substance depends
on this convenient property of the function.
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Figure 1: Payoffs in the Discrete Fixed Budget Example
lobbying costs, which are 1 for each firm and strategy profile, the game has
the payoff matrix described in Table 1, where  corresponds to  = 1 and
 corresponds to  = 0.
The equilibrium structure is described by Figure 2. As long as   ,
that is, to the left of the diagonal, both firms engage in general lobbying,
with resulting total emissions level 2 (1 + 2) = 4. For   , the equilib-
rium switches, as both firms engage in private lobbying, with resulting total
emissions level  (1 + 2) = 2. Thus, in the cone between the diagonal 
and the dashed line  = 2, the equilibrium is inefficient from the firms’
point of view: If both switched to general lobbying, the emissions and thus
firm payoffs would increase.
Figure 3 sums up the effect of an increase in the effectiveness of private
lobbying  on the equilibrium level of total emissions, with  fixed at 5.
Qualitatively, the same results hold for all other positive values of . As
long as    = 5, an increase of  has no effect on total emissions, as only
general lobbying takes place in equilibrium. A marginal increase of  around
 = 5 leads to a drop in emissions to half the original level. Thus, a change
in parameters with a positive direct effect on firms induces an undesirable
strategic effect.16 Firms face a stronger temptation to engage in private lob-
bying, even though it is inefficient for the group of firms. A further increase
16Similar arguments have been made in the context of oligopoly games ( Cabral and
Villas-Boas 2001).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Structure in the Discrete Case with Fixed Budget
of , however, leaves the equilibrium structure unaffected and the situation
for firms improves. When   2 = 10, the firms are eventually better off
than in the general lobbying equilibrium: Private lobbying is actually more
productive in reducing total emissions than general lobbying.
The main conclusion from this example is that, somewhat paradoxically, if
politicians react more favorably to private lobbying of firms, the environment
may win and firms may lose. Firms are tempted to focus on private lobbying
even though it is not efficient for them as a group. In the following, we
investigate the robustness of this argument. Specifically, to which extent
does our argument rely on the assumption of a fixed budget? Phrased in our
{0 1}-framework: how important is it that firms can only choose between
private and general lobbying, whereas ”no lobbying” or ”private and general
lobbying” are not feasible options?
3.2 Endogenous Budget
In a first step towards endogenizing the amount of lobbying, suppose firms
can choose  ∈ {0 1},  ∈ {0 1} without the restriction that  = 1 − .
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Figure 3: Increasing the Productivity of Private Lobbying in the Discrete
Case with Fixed Budget
With payoff functions as in (5) and (6), the payoff matrix is given as in Table
4.17
There are four conceivable symmetric pure strategy equilibria: both firms
engage in private and general lobbying ( ); both firms only engage in
private lobbying (  ); both firms only engage in general lobbying ();
neither firm engages in lobbying (0 0). Up to permutations of firms, there
are six candidates for asymmetric pure strategy equilibria ( 0)  (  ) 
( 0)  ( 0)  ()  (). However, the last four of these constella-
tions cannot arise in equilibrium, except for knife-edge cases. Such equilibria
would require exactly one firm to engage in private lobbying. But if private
lobbying is profitable for one firm, it is also profitable for the other one.18
17In the table,  corresponds to  = 1 	 = 0; 
 corresponds to  = 0 	 = 1, 

corresponds to  = 	 = 1.
18Given any total level 	 of general lobbying, a firm that decides to engage in private
lobbying increases its emissions from 	 to +	. Thus, the difference in net payoffs between
choosing  = 1 and  = 0 is
√
 + 	−√	−1 for both firms. Thus, if
√
 + 	−√	−1 6= 0,
12
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P 1,0-  1,-1,-   1,1    2,1    
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Figure 4: Payoff Matrix for the Discrete Case with Endogenous Budget
Figure 5 shows that the four symmetric constellations and each of the re-
maining asymmetric constellations actually are equilibria for non-degenerate
parameter areas.
The implications of an increase in private lobbying effectiveness  are
now more subtle than in the fixed budget case. Intuitively, if the equilibrium
switches as a result of an increase in , this need not result in lower emissions.
An increase in  may induce more private lobbying without inducing less
general lobbying. Depending on the effectiveness of general lobbying (),
four scenarios can arise. Emissions are never decreasing in  for the first two
scenarios, but undergo downward jumps in the third and fourth.
Non-Decreasing Emissions (for low )
(i) For very ineffective general lobbying (  1), there will be no lobbying
at all if  is also small (  1): Neither type of lobbying is sufficiently
profitable to justify the lobbying cost. Thus, total emissions are zero.
As  increases, both firms will engage in private lobbying ( ), so
that total emissions are 2. Thus, at  = 1, there is a discontinuous
upward jump in emissions as  increases. Higher effectiveness of private
lobbying is thus good for firms and bad for the environment for   1.
(ii) The effect is slightly less pronounced in the region where   1, but
 = 1  = 0 is impossible in equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Equilibria in the Discrete Case with Endogenous Budget
√
2−√  1 (1    5
83): Here, for low values of , there will be a
chicken-type equilibrium ( 0). One firm engages in general lobbying,
providing benefits of
√
 to the other. Given this amount of general
lobbying, additional general lobbying by the second firm would yield
√
2−√ in additional benefits, which is not worth the costs of 1 in this
parameter regime. As  increases beyond , the only equilibrium has
both firms engaging in private lobbying ( ). Emissions are therefore
2 for    and 2  2 for   . Thus, higher attention to private
lobbying increases total emissions, but there is no discrete jump in
emission levels at the regime boundary.
Downward jumps of Emissions (for high )
If
√
2 − √  1, the chicken equilibrium ( 0) breaks down for low
values of . Instead, general lobbying is valuable enough for both firms to
engage in it. Thus total emissions are constant at  = 4. The outcome as
 increases depends on the exact size of .
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Figure 6: Increasing the Effectiveness of Private Lobbying in the Discrete
Case with Endogenous Budget, scenario (iii).
(iii) If
√
3 −
√
2  1 (  9
89), the equilibrium structure switches as
 increases beyond : It becomes attractive for one firm to free ride
on the other, resulting in a chicken equilibrium (  ). Emissions in
this regime are = 2 + 2, thus increasing in . As private lobbying
becomes even more attractive
³√
 
√
 +  − 1
´
, both firms engage
in private lobbying only. Emissions are then  = 2, that is, there
is a discrete downward jump at the regime boundary, followed by a
gradual increase of emissions. The emissions behavior in this regime is
summarized in Figure 6, which corresponds to  = 7. Thus, for a non-
degenerate region of ’s, things are as in the fixed budget case: Starting
from sufficiently low values of , greater effectiveness of private lobbying
may lead to a strategic disadvantage of the firms, which results in lower
emissions, as long as the increase in  is not so large that positive direct
effects overwhelm negative strategic effects.
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Figure 7: Increasing the Effectiveness of Private Lobbying in the Discrete
Case with Endogenous Budget, scenario (iv)
(iv) For
√
3 −
√
2  1 (  9
89),the main conclusion is similar, but the
pattern is slightly more complex. The emission pattern as a function
of  is described in Figure 7, which corresponds to  = 12. Here,
as  increases, the equilibrium first switches from () to ( ),
obviously resulting in higher emissions. Next, however, the equilibrium
switches to the chicken equilibrium (  ) and finally to ( ). At
each of the last two regime boundaries, there is a discrete drop in
emission, which reflects the same strategic effects as (iii) above.
To sum up, while the emissions behavior is more complex in the flexible
budget case, the qualitative insight that higher effectiveness of private lob-
bying crowds out general lobbying and thereby reduces emissions still holds
for suitable changes in , provided general lobbying is sufficiently effective¡√
2 −√
¢
= 1. The intuition is straightforward. Because profits are con-
cave in emissions, if higher  induces more private lobbying, this reduces the
16
benefits from general lobbying.
It is interesting to compare the nature of the free-rider-problem with
the familiar underinvestment problem in a pure public goods situation with
 = 0. In this case, inefficiency for the firms arises only if  is small (cases (i)
and (ii)): As we have seen, for higher , firms that decide only about whether
or not to engage in general lobbying, would both choose  = 1, as general
lobbying is so effective that it is even worthwhile for both firms when they
behave non-cooperatively. A chicken or zero-investment equilibrium will only
arise for lower . Sufficiently effective private lobbying, however, may turn
the equilibrium into an inefficient one, even if it is efficient for  = 0. Thus,
the possibility of private lobbying creates a public goods problem for such 
where none exists with  = 0.
4 Continuous Lobbying with Fixed Budgets
We now give up the assumption that lobbying is a (0,1)-decision. However,
as in section 3.1, we assume that the budget of each lobby is fixed and nor-
malized to one. This assumption is slightly more than just a convenient sim-
plification: In some contexts, the budget will be hard to change. An industry
lobby finances its campaigns from the contributions of its members which,
at least in the short term, cannot be increased arbitrarily. Nevertheless, we
shall consider the case of an endogenous budget in the next section.
We restrict ourselves to the separable specification given by (5) and (6).
We thus consider the game with  ∈ [0 1] and objective functions
e ¡ ; ¢ =

¡

¡
  1−  − ; 
¢¢
= 
¡

¡
2−  − 
¢
+ 
¡
  
¢¢
We are interested in comparative statics with respect to the effectiveness
parameter 
 To carry out these comparative statics and to guarantee local
stability, we introduce the next assumption.
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Assumption 3 e ( ) is twice continuously differentiable with respect to
all variables and ee − ee  0.19
This game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, (1∗ 
2
∗).
20 For any
interior equilibrium, straightforward calculations yield:


=
−ee + eeee − ee (7)


= −


(8)
Intuitively, one would expect a higher  to increase private lobbying: By
definition, e =  2 ≥ 0.21 Thus, a higher  increases the marginal
returns to increasing , so that, other things being equal, more private lob-
bying should result. However, because of strategic effects, an additional
assumption is needed to give the result.
Proposition 1 If the politician becomes more responsive to private lobbying
( increases), private lobbying efforts of firm  ( 6= 	) increase if and only if

¡
 + 


¢
− 
¡
 + 


¢
 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Using (4) and the concavity of  and , the following simple implication
is immediate.
Corollary 1 If private lobbying efforts are strategic complements at the equi-
librium
¡e ≥ 0, or equivalently,  +  ≥ 0¢   is increasing in  for  =
1 2.
19Here and in the following, subscripts stand for derivatives, i.e., e = 2e etc.
20The strategy spaces are non-empty, convex and compact subsets of R, and the payoff
functions are continuous and quasiconcave. The proof thus follows immediately from
Mas-Colell et al. (1995, prop. 8.D.3).
21e =  ·  +  ¡ −¢, but  − = 0 in equilibrium.
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Intuitively, with strategic complements, the direct effects of  on 1 and 2
are mutually reinforcing: The direct effect of  on 1 induces a positive effect
on 2 and vice versa. However, strategic complements are not necessarily
the most convincing assumption: As e =  ¡ +¢ and   0, the
concavity of  yields a force against complementarity. Intuitively, if player
	 increases private lobbying, he must reduce general lobbying. Doing so
increases the marginal effectiveness of general lobbying for player , given
the concavity of . Strategic complements require  À 0. Thus, we also
need to consider strategic substitutes.
With strategic substitutes, the indirect effects of private lobbying are
more complex than with complements: an increase in private lobbying by
one firm induces decreasing private lobbying by the other one. Thus, the
positive direct effects of  on 1 and vice versa tend to offset each other to
some extent. Potentially, as Figure 8 suggests, even though both reaction
curves shift to the right (from  () to 
	
 ()), the indirect effect may lead
to a reduction in private lobbying by one firm. In Figure 8, the equilibrium
changes from
¡
  


¢
to
¡
	  
	

¢
. Proposition 2 shows that, with strategic
substitutes, a reduction of private lobbying for firm  requires that the own
responsiveness to private lobbying () is small relative to the other firm’sµ






+

+



¶
. This suggests that at most one firm will reduce private
lobbying if  increases. An immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that
this is indeed true.
Corollary 2 If private lobbying becomes more effective ( increases), at least
one firm increases private lobbying.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 2 immediately leads to the next result.
Corollary 3 Suppose both firms have identical payoff functions. If the equi-
librium is symmetric before and after an increase in , private lobbying must
increase with .
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Figure 8: Comparative Statics in the Continuous Case with Fixed Budget
The proof is straightforward. By corollary 2, at least one firm increases
private lobbying. By symmetry, therefore, both firms increase private lob-
bying. In a symmetric equilibrium, the change in the effectiveness of private
lobbying affects both firms in the same way. The direct and strategic effects
are the same for both firms. An increase of  gives both firms the same
direct incentive to increase private lobbying. Strategic effects dampen this
incentive, but do not reverse it: direct effects dominate over strategic effects,
and private lobbying by both firms increases.
Do firms benefit if the politician gets more responsive to private lobbying?
What is the effect on the environment? Total lobbying expenditures do
not change, because budgets are fixed by assumption. A firm benefits from
a change of  if the induced lobbying responses lead to higher individual
pollution standards. The total effect on the environment depends on how
both individual pollution standards change. Total emissions are:
 = 2(2− 1 − 2) + 1(1 2 ) + 2(1 2 )
The following proposition provides a strong argument that an increase in
20
the effectiveness of private lobbying benefits the environment:
Proposition 2 With fixed budgets, emissions decrease with  if and only if
(a) both firms increase private lobbying, or
(b) only one firm, say firm 1, decreases private lobbying and
−1( − 21)  −2(− + 12)

Intuitively, three effects occur if a firm increases private lobbying: First,
the individual loophole increases, which harms the environment. Second,
as  ≤ 0, the opponent’s loophole tends to become smaller, which reduces
emissions. Third, because of the fixed budget, more private lobbying means
less general lobbying. The base levels of emissons decline, which affects both
firms. Thus the only effect which might harm the environment is the increase
of the individual loophole. Note that firms equate the marginal benefit of
private lobbying () with its cost (−) in equilibrium. Hence, the negative
effect through an increase of the individual loophole offsets the positive effect
through the decrease of one’s own base level. Positive environmental effects
through a smaller base level and a smaller loophole of the opponent remain.
In a symmetric equilibrium, both firms increase private lobbying. As a result,
environmental quality improves.
If one firm () reduces private lobbying, whereas the other one increases
it, emissions might go up if |  | is large relative to |  | and firm 	 0
strategic reaction to the decrease in  is weak relative to firm 0 reaction
to the increase in  as stated in proposition 2.
Proposition 2, which generalizes the example from section 3.1, is our
central result for the fixed budget case. It indicates that, in this setting, an
increasing importance of loopholes tends to benefit the environment, at least
in a symmetric situation. If lobbying becomes more important, firms focus
on lobbying activities which tend to be ineffective.
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5 Continuous Lobbying with Endogenous
Budget
With exogenous budgets, an increase in private lobbying necessarily coincides
with a decrease in general lobbying. As we have seen, environmental quality
therefore tends to increase with the effectiveness of private lobbying.
Now suppose budgets are endogenous. Thus, in the framework of section
2, suppose ( ) can be chosen from [0∞)× [0∞).22 Further, for simplic-
ity, we restrict the analysis to a symmetric setting where 1 = 2 ≡ ;1 =
2 ≡ , and we only consider symmetric equilibria, which we denote as
(1∗ 
2
∗ 
1
∗ 
2
∗) such that 
1
∗ = 
2
∗ and 
1
∗ = 
2
∗.
As we saw for the discrete case in section 3.2, with endogenous budgets
it is no longer obvious that an increase in private lobbying decreases general
lobbying: Firms could increase both types of lobbying following an increase
in . However, for the separable case described by (5) and (6), simple cal-
culations show that Π = 



  0, i.e., private and general lobbying
are substitutes in a firm’s objective function. Thus, it is at least true for
an individual firm that an increase in  reduces the marginal returns from
increasing . Intuitively, as  increases, so do allowed emissions. Because of
the concavity of the profit function in , the profit increase resulting from a
further increase of allowed emissions by general lobbying therefore falls. Ig-
noring strategic interactions, this would suggest that greater private lobbying
and lower general lobbying go hand in hand. In this section, we explore to
which extent such a claim remains true with strategic interactions. We do
so by considering various special cases.
22The proof of this claim uses Prop. 8.D.3 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995). Assumption 1
guarantees that strategies with + 	   are strictly dominated, so that, to find a Nash
equilibrium, one can assume compact strategy spaces.
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5.1 Non-Competitive Lobbying in the Separable Case
First, consider the separable specification given by (5) and (6) and suppose
further that private lobbying has no effect on the loophole of the other party.
Condition WLC:  (
 ) = 0 for arbitrary ( ), .
This corresponds to extremely weak lobbying competition: private lobby-
ing has no adverse effect on the competitor.
Proposition 3 If WLC holds, then an increase in  leads to more private
lobbying and less general lobbying.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In spite of the reduction in general lobbying, it is not clear what happens
to the emissions level when the effectiveness of private lobbying increases.
For instance, consider the following specification
 =
³

¡

¢12
+  + 
´
  () = ()
12  (9)
with   0. Simple numerical calculations show that  is independent of
 as long as  is sufficiently small, as reduced general and increased private
lobbying cancel out. Thus, from the environmental point of view, the effec-
tiveness of lobbying does not matter. For higher , there is no more general
lobbying, and emissions are increasing in .
In another example, the effect of increasing private lobbying dominates.
Suppose
 =
³

¡

¢12
+
¡
 + 
¢12´
  () = ln () 

Then equilibrium emissions for  ∈ [0 5] are given in Figure 9.
5.2 Fully competitive lobbying in the Separable Case
As the opposite extreme, we use the following additional condition in the
separable specification given by (3) and (4)
Condition ILC:  = 0 and 

 = − at the equilibrium.
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Figure 9: An Example of Weak Lobbying competition
Condition ILC says that, if both firms increase private lobbying by the
same amount, individual loopholes do not change. It thus corresponds to
a situation of intense lobbying competition, and it is a boundary case with
respect to the conditions described by (4).
Proposition 4 Suppose ILC holds. If the politician becomes more respon-
sive to private lobbying, then private lobbying efforts by both firms increase.
General lobbying, however, remains unaffected, as does the emissions level.
The intuition for the result is as follows: If the politician gets more re-
sponsive to private lobbying, both firms have the same direct incentive to
increase private lobbying. By condition ILC, the additional private lobbying
efforts cancel out. Thus, emissions levels are unaffected by private lobbying,
and the incentives to increase general lobbying remain unaffected. In other
words, a general increase in the responsiveness to private lobbying only leads
to counteractive lobbying effects, but not to a change in regulation. There is
no effect on the equilibrium base levels of pollution, the individual loopholes
and the overall level of pollution. Firms lose if the politician gets more re-
sponsive to private lobbying, because their equilibrium lobbying efforts are
higher, without any corresponding gain. Proposition 4 is important because
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it clarifies that the statements that a positive effect of  on the firms and a
negative effect on the environment are not equivalent.
5.3 The Non-Separable Case
In the above examples, the separability assumption implied that increases
in one type of lobbying did not reduce the marginal effect of the other type
of lobbying on emissions. As discussed in section 2.2, separability is not
necessarily the most convincing assumption. Therefore, we also consider a
non-separable specification:
 = 
¡

¢12
+
( + )
12
 + 
−  − ;   0  ≥ 0; () = 0 (10)
This specification satisfies all the properties laid out in section 2. In
particular, an increase in  would increase allowed emission levels for both
parties if private lobbying levels remained unchanged. Further, with  ≥ 0,
an increase in private lobbying decreases the effects of general lobbying on the
competitors allowed emissions, as 
2

= − 1
2
√
(+)(+)2
 0. As long
as  is close to 0 private lobbying has a strong negative influence on the
effectiveness of general lobbying, as  increases, the effect becomes smaller.
Numerical calculations show that  = 
2
4
for arbitrary , so that private
lobbying is increasing in . Further, they show that general lobbying is a
decreasing function of  such that the lower , the more rapid the decline
of general lobbying as a function of .
Finally, Figure 10 plots the net effect, which depends on : For high
values ( = 1; dotted line), emissions are monotone increasing in . For low
values ( = 0
5; dashed line and  = 0
1; solid line), emissions are first
decreasing and then increasing in . Broadly, this behavior is similar to the
pattern identified in the discrete example (section 3.2). Intuitively, if private
lobbying has a strong negative influence on the effectiveness of general lob-
bying ( small), starting from low values, higher  first decreases emissions,
because the induced increase in private lobbying reduces the effectiveness of
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Figure 10: An Example with Non-Separable Emissions
general lobbying. As  grows beyond a certain level, private lobbying is so
much higher than general lobbying that the crowding out on general lobbying
no longer matters, and emissions grow.
6 Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that distributive concerns among anti-environmentalist
lobbies may lead to improved environmental quality. Firms put more empha-
sis on private lobbying the more they expect politicians to supply loopholes.
If the lobbying budget is fixed, an increase in private lobbying induces a de-
crease in general lobbying, the net effect of which is a reduction in emissions.
The results are less clear-cut in the flexible budget case, but they continue
to hold if private lobbying has a sufficiently strong negative effect on general
26
lobbying.
It is important to note that the politicians responsiveness to private lob-
bying does not just reflect his preferences. It depends in an essential manner
on the type of regulation considered. In some cases, the very nature of the
problem will leave only limited scope for private lobbying. In others, there
are so many ways to design a regulation that the politician’s discretion is
rather high. We can conclude from our analysis that environmental regula-
tion is more likely in the latter case than in the former. However, there is
an important caveat to our analysis. We have focussed entirely on distri-
butional concerns among anti-environmental lobbies. Symmetric issues arise
with pro-environmental lobbies, however. Environmental lobbies will be in
favor of environmental regulations, but may disagree on the right type. For
instance, with respect to climate policy, some environmentalists advocate
joint implementation, whereas others are strictly against it. More gener-
ally, attitudes towards market instruments differ across environmentalists.
Similarly, environmentalists disagree on the relative importance of different
topics: For instance, for some nuclear energy constitutes the main problem,
whereas others are more concerned about climate issues. Thus, some groups
concentrate on ”private lobbying” against nuclear energy, whereas others fo-
cus on private lobbying against carbon dioxide. The ”general lobbying” for
reduced total energy consumption may therefore suffer, for reasons similar to
the ones discussed in the paper. Clearly, there may be cases where the dis-
agreements between environmentalists are less profound than those between
anti-environmental lobbies. Casual evidence for energy policy suggests, how-
ever, that this is not necessarily so.
Although our model is formulated as a lobbying game against environ-
mental regulation, the general idea is potentially relevant for arbitrary policy
games such that interest groups have a common aim, but compete about the
distribution of its benefit. For example, consider the lobbying behavior of
different import industries fighting for protection. The industries will agree
in that they prefer a high general degree of protection. But given that a
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certain level of protection is realized, they disagree about how protection
should be distributed across industries. Similarly, consider redistribution
schemes between the members of federal states. Net recipients of transfers
have a common interest in a high level of redistribution, but compete about
the distribution of these gains. It will be the subject of further research to
understand the implications of our arguments in these settings.
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7 Appendix
7.1 A: Continuous Lobbying with Fixed Budget: Proofs
7.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The denominator of 


is positive by (7) and assumption 3. Hence

n


o
= {−ee + ee}
= 
©
−


¡
 +
¢
+ 




¡
 +
¢ª
= {−( + ) + ( + )}.
This yields the result.
7.1.2 Proof of Corollary 2
By corollary 1, we can restrict ourselves to the case that e =  ¡ +¢ 
0. Suppose that both firms decrease . From proposition 1,
(+
111)
(+
221)


11

22
and
(+
222)
(+
112)


22

11
must hold. These two conditions yield
(+
111)
(+
221)


11

22

(+
112)
(+
222)
and thus ( + 
1
11)( + 
2
22)  ( + 
1
12)( + 
2
21).
This contradicts assumption 3, which implies that ( + 
1
11)( + 
2
22) 
( + 
1
12)( + 
2
21). Thus at least one firm must increase 
.
7.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The effect of a change (1 2) on total emissions is
 = −2(1 + 2) + (11 + 21)1 + (22 + 12)2.
By the first order conditions,  = 
1
1 = 
2
2 in equilibrium, so that
 = [− + 21]1 + [− + 12]2.
Result (b) immediately follows.
If both firms increase private lobbying,   0 is equivalent to
1
2
 − [−
2
2 + 
1
2]
[−11 + 21]
.
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Note that the right hand side is negative and the left hand side is positive.
Emissions thus fall if both firms increase private lobbying.
7.2 B: Continuous Lobbying with Endogenous Budget:
Proofs
By symmetry, for  = 1 2,
Π = 


¡

¢2
+ 

 ≤ 0 (11)
Π111 = Π
1
12 = Π
2
21 = Π
2
22 = 

 ()
2 +  ≤ 0 (12)
Π111 = Π
1
11
= Π112 = Π
2
21
= Π222 = Π
2
22
= 

 ≤ 0 (13)
Π112 = Π
2
21 = 



 −  R 0 (14)
Π112 = Π
2
21
= 

 ≥ 0 (15)
Π11 = Π
2
2 = 



 + 





 ≥ 0 (16)
Π11 = Π
2
2
= 

 ≤ 0 (17)
Using these conditions together with the implicit function theorem, find-
ing ∗ and 

∗ reduces to the solution of¡
 + 


¢
∗ + 2



∗ = −¡
 + 


¢
∗ + 2



∗ = −
which is given by
∗

=


 − ³


´2
+ 



− 



− 



 (18)
∗

=
1
2


 + 



 −  − ³

´2
+ 

 −  − 
(19)
We can now use these conditions to derive propositions 3 and 4.
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7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
WLC, (14) and (15) imply Π = 0 and Π

 = 0. Therefore, using (19)
and (18),
∗

=


 − ³

´2
− 

∗

=
1
2


 − ³

´2
− 

 (20)
(11)-(17) show that the numerator of 

∗

is negative and the denominator
of 

∗

is positive. The denominators in (20) are negative by concavity of .
7.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (16), (17) and  = 0 yield Π

 = 



  0, Π

 = 0 and Π

 =
Π . Thus, by (7) and (19)
∗

= −
Π
³
Π

−Π

´  0 and ∗

= 0. By ILC, total emissions are
therefore unchanged.
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